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ANN B. HOPKINS, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit 
BRIEF FOR THE; AMERICAN FEDERAT'ION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICUS CURIAE 
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT 
This brief amicus curiae is filed by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Orga-nizations ( AFL-CIO), a federation of 90 national and international labor organizations having a total member-ship of approximately 13,000,000 working men and women, with •the consent of the parties as provided for in this Court's rules. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This proceeding, contrary to Price Waterhouse's con-tention, is a relatively straightforward mixed motive case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 432 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.: .the district court's findings, reviewed and approved by the court of appeals, establish 
2 
that sex-based considerations were given significant, nega-
tive weight in the promotion review process which led to 
denying plaintiff a partnership. 
The issue directly before this Court concerns the place-
ment and the nature of the burden of proof on the ques-
tion whether the disadvantage the plaintiff suffered in 
the promotion evaluation process in the end made a dif-
ference in producing the decision to deny her a partner-
ship. As Price Waterhouse recognizes, however, it 
facilitates analysis first to delineate the necessary com-
ponents of a Title VII cause of action. 
1. The language and structure of both of the principal 
substantive sections of Title VII, §§703(a)(l) & (2), 
as interpreted in this Court's cases, convincingly support 
the conclusion that an employee evaluation system biased 
against women violates Title VII without regard to the 
precise impact of that bias on each particular decision. 
The "because of . . . sex" language in those sections of 
the statute does not indicate otherwise; that language is 
best read as requiring that a discriminatory consideration 
be a basis for the challenged employment practice; when 
that practice is a decision-making process that weighs 
gender as a negative consideration, the requisite motiva-
tional element is self-evident. 
2. This construction of Title VII comports with and 
is essential to further the statute's basic policies. Title 
VII's high purpose is to assure that discriminatory fac-
tors do not play a role in the distribution of benefits and 
privileges in the workplace. It is self evident that permit-
ting employers to incorporate sex-based factors in their 
decisionmaking process as long as no determinative im-
pact on any particular employment decision can be proven 
frustrates that purpose. 
3. This Court's cases in analogous areas support the 
conclusion that a cause of action for violation of a rule 




can be made out without demonstrating that the tainted 
aspect of the process in fact accounted for the negative 
decision. Where such causes of action are recognized, the 
issue of the connection between the impermissible aspect 
of the process and the result becomes a problem at the 
relief but not the liability stage; once liability for an 
illegal decision-making process is established, the burden 
of proof as to whether the same result would have oc-
curred through a proper system is placed on the de-
fendant. 
4. Nothing in contemporary tort law regarding causa-
tion detracts from the foregoing analysis. Rather, mod-
ern tort doctrine in large part parallels that analysis, by 
recognizing liability whenever culpable conduct is a "sub-
stantial factor" in bringing about the harm protected 
against, by focussing on policy questions in defining that 
harm and the requisite causal connection to the culpable 
conduct, and by shifting to the defendant the burden of 
proof as to causation when it is unfair, on policy grounds, 
to place that burden upon innocent plaintiffs. 
5. Once it is established that an employer commits a 
Title VII violation by following a biased decision-making 
process, the conclusion that the burden falls upon the 
employer to avoid make whole relief in a particular case 
by proving that there was no economic injury traceable 
to its illegal act follows a fortiori . As the party that 
created both the risk tJhat a discriminatory factor would 
be determinative and the risk that the precise impact of 
such a mental factor would be very difficult to recon-
struct after the fact, it is appropriate, as this Court has 
held in analogous cases, to place the risk of an error in 
the judicial fact-finding process upon the wrongdoer. 
Moreover, while this Court has not previously explicitly 
so held, as a practical matter decision-makers have recog-
nized that given the hypothetical and psychological nature 
of the issue at the relief stage, it is appropriate to insist 
that the employer meet its affirmative burden through 
4 
objective, reliable kinds of evidence, and to require as 
well that the likelihood that the illicit factor affected the 
result be very small. A "clear and convincing" evidence 




(a) The defendant Price-Waterhouse, an accounting 
firm, has a collegial decision-making system for admitting 
employees to the partnership. The district court found 
that this system gave substantial weight to "comments 
influenced by sexual stereotypes" and in that way "in-
ject [ ed] stereotyped assumptions about women into the 
selection process." Pet. App. 57a, 58a. That court con-
cluded that "the Policy Board's decision not to admit the 
plaintiff to partnership was tainted by discriminatory 
evaluations;" the employer's decision was the "direct 
result" of "the maintenance of a system that gave weight 
to such biased criticisms" and "that made evaluations 
based on 'outmoded attitudes' determinative." Pet. App. 
56a, 58a-59a. 
Price Waterhouse argues that the district court's find-
ings are insufficient to demonstrate that sex-based con-
siderations played any role at all in the decisional process 
that produced the promotion decision adverse to the plain-
tiff. According to the employer "the only evidence of 
'mixed motives' was the presence of an intuitively divined 
element of sexual stereotyping in the atmosphere." Pet. 
Br. at 43. 
The district court's conclusion that the decision at issue 
here was infected by sexual stereotyping was not "intui-
tively divined", but was based instead on consideration 
of the evidence before that court. The court of appeals 
reviewed at length (Pet. App. 10a-17a) the evidence sup-
porting that conclusion, noting that the district court's 
finding was based upon not only the expert evidence on 
T 
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sex stereotyping but also upon the comments made about 
the plaintiff herself and about other women candidates 
for partnership as part of the evaluation system. Based 
upon that review, the court of appeals concluded that the 
district court's finding in this regard was not "clearly 
erroneous", since "there is ample support in the record 
for the District Court's finding that the partnership selec-
tion process at Price Waterhouse was impermissibly in-
fected by stereotypical attitudes towards female candi-
dates." Pet. App. 12a, 17a. The court of appeals there-
fore performed properly its task of reviewing the district 
court's factual findings in 1:Jhis regard. Anderson v. City 
of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 ( 1985) ; Pullman Standard v. 
Swint, 456 U.S. 273 ( 1982) .1 
The district court found, moreover, that sex stereo-
typing was not simply "in the atmosphere" but in Price 
Waterhouse's promotion system, and that this stereotyp-
ing had a "direct" impact on the negative evaluation of 
the plaintiff for partnership. Again, the court of appeals 
reviewed this finding carefully ( Pet. App. 20a) , and con-
cluded that while the plaintiff "has not demonstrated the 
exact impact that stereotyped comments had on the 
Board's ultimate decision", there was "ample support for 
[the district court's] conclusion that stereotyping played 
a significant role in blocking plaintiff's admission to the 
partnership." Pet. App. 20a (emphasis supplied). 
Whether the court of appeals was correct in this regard 
or not presents, once again, only a question of the ade-
quacy of the court of appeal's review of the district court's 
fact findings. And, once again, it appears that the court 
1 While we address the point we note that the propriety o.f the 
court of appeals' review of the district court's factual findings is. a 
question not fairly encompassed within the question presented for 
review (Pet. Br. I), and one with which this Court in any event 
rarely concerns itself. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 
U.S. 271, 275 (1949); R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme 




of appeals proceeded properly with respect to this factual 
review issue. 
(b) Thus, despite Price Waterhouse's protestations to 
the contrary (Pet. Br. at 42-50), as the court of appeals 
recognized this is "a case of mixed motivation [because] 
. . . [ t] he District Court simply found that both plaintiff's 
personality and the sexually stereotyped reactions to her 
personality were significant factors in the firm's decision 
to hold her candidacy." Pet. App. 25a (emphasis sup-
plied). As the proceeding comes to this Court, the critical 
finding of the district court, affirmed by the court of 
appeals, is that because of her sex, plaintiff was evaluated 
less favorably than she would have been on the basis of 
her personality standing alone. 
That being so, the point of controversy here concerns 
whether the less-favorable-evaluation-on-the-basis-of-sex 
component of Price Waterhouse's decision-making process 
was sufficient to make the difference between a partner-
ship off er and the "hold" that actually occurred. Indeed, 
the parties have focussed on where the burden of persua-
sion lies with respect to that point and the nature of that 
burden. 
However, as Price Waterhouse recognizes. ( Pet. Br. at 
21), in order to resolve that controversy, it is neces-
sary first to determine the basic parameters of a viable 
Title VII cause of action. In order to know who has what 
burden of persuasion here one first has to know whether 
a showing that an employer maintains a selection process 
that in some respect is biased against women, and subjects 
women to that process, makes out a violation of Title VII. 
Price Waterhouse argues that such a showing is not suf-
ficient; according to the employer, Title VII focusses only 
upon the employment decision ultimately made, and does 
not concern itself with the fairness of the process through 
which that decision is made. Pet. Br. at 20-27. This con-
tention is simply incorrect. And not surprisingly Price 













question as to the relevance of proof that any sex dif-
ferentiation in the evaluation process did not cause the 
plaintiff any economic loss-which rests on the employer's 
false premise-is incorrect as well. 
(c) As we understand Price Waterhouse's position, the 
employer would agree that the plaintiff has made out a 
Title VII case where an illegitimate consideration is one 
of several reasons for an employment decision as long as 
that reason was determinative, either independently or 
in combination with other, legitimate reasons. 
Thus, for example, if an employer were considering 
three employees for discharge due to economic conditions 
-a woman who was a fully competent employee, a woman 
who was not a fully competent employee, and a man who 
was the least competent employee of the three-and dis-
charged the less competent of the two women, Price 
Waterhouse would agree that a finder of fact could infer 
that the employer had "mixed motives"; the employer did 
not regard being a woman alone as sufficient for dis-
charge, but the employer did treat being a woman as a 
negative consideration in the evaluation process. Since it 
is clear that it was "because of" that negative considera-
tion-her gender- ( although also because of her lack of 
competence) that the less competent of two women was 
discharged, Price Waterhouse would recognize that Title 
VII had been violated. Cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Co., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).2 
2 In light of the argument made by Price Waterhouse with regard 
to the burden of persuasion issue presented here (Pet. Br. at 29-
36), it is important to note that the situation delineated by this 
example is quite separate from one in which the claim that there 
is a nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge (or for any other 
employment decision) is pretextual. 
A pretextual explanation is, as this Court has. explained, one 
which is "a coverup". McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 805 ( 1973). See also, Webster's New World Dictionary 1127 
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This case (like most mixed motive cases) presents a 
more complex variant of the hypothetical situation just 
discussed. In this case the district court found that Price 
Waterhouse has set up an evaluation system which con-
siders not two considerations but many in deciding upon 
promotions; that gender is included in that set of consid-
erations as a negative factor of "significant" weight; and 
that since the system is a qualitative one leaving ample 
room for informed discretion, it is not possible to quan-
tify the effect of gender in any particular situation. And 
contrary to our hypothetical, in a case like this it is not 
possible to determine the precise impact of the gender 
consideration simply by comparing otherwise similarly 
situated individuals; the pertinent considerations are too 
complex, as indicated by the district court's conclusion 
that the plaintiff had not identified any men sufficiently 
similar to her in all pertinent respects to serve as an ap-
(2d College Ed.) (defining "pretext" as "a false reason or motive 
put forth to hide the real one, excuse" and as a "coverup; front"). 
The concept o.f "pretext" thus concerns an alleged dissonance be-
tween an employer's explanation of his motives and his motives 
in fact. 
In a mixed motive situation, the nondiscriminatory motive may 
be pretextual or not, depending upon whether the employer also 
acknowledges the illegitimate, discriminatory motive. If, in the 
above example, the employer insisted that his only criteria for dis-
charge was incompetence, that would be a pretextual explanation, 
since an incompetent man was retained. If, on the other hand, the 
employer acknowledged his true mixed motives, there would be no 
pretext. The employer would, however, be liable, even on Price 
Waterhouse's theory in this case, although the nondiscriminatory 
motive was not pretextual and was itself another determinative 
reason in making the discharge decision. 
In short, the problems of pretext and of mixed motivation have 
little to do with each other. Cases dealing with pretext (e.g., Mc-
Donnell Douglas, supra, and Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)) concern the determination 
of what the employer's motivation really was, while the mixed 
motive problem arises only once that determination is made and 








propriate test of the impact of gender upon the promotion 
decision. Pet. App. 49a. 
It is nonetheless true that, in this case as in our 
hypothetical, the employer treated gender as a negative 
consideration in the process of making an employment 
decision, and in that sense based its evaluation upon an 
illegitimate consideration.3 And it is also undeniable that 
the employer by doing so has created a situation in which 
there is a significant risk that discriminatory considera-
tions will in fact be determinative in particular situations, 
a risk that would be absent if only legitimate factors were 
considered in making promotion decisions. 
Price Waterhouse's fundamental position in this case 
proceeds from the premise that an employer is free to 
employ such a tainted decisionmaking system, and is not 
open to a Title VII suit by a woman (or a group of 
women) subject to the system to enjoin its operation on 
the ground that the system as such violates Title VII. 
Pet. Br. at 27-28. According to the employer, only if the 
sex-based consideration embedded in the decisionmaking 
process were proven by the plaintiff in a particular case 
to have played a "decisive role" in a specific employment 
decision with adverse economic consequences would Title 
3 Again, a hypothetical example may clarify this point. Price 
Waterhouse might have instituted a more formal evaluation system, 
providing for point rankings of the various candidates, based upon 
different point values for different relevant qualities. If the em-
ployer assigned a number of negative points for being a woman, the 
impact would be basically the same as the sex stereotyping in this 
case; the only difference would be that the impact would be precisely 
measurable, because the entire system would be based on quantify-
ing considerations. Cf. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts 
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 262 n.7 (1979); Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267-77 (1978). In that hypotheti-
cal, as in this case, gender would be a negative, although not neces-
sarily a determinative, factor in every evaluation of a woman, and 
the employer would be basing its evaluation upon both legitimate 
and illegitimate factors. 
---
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VII be violated. Pet. Br. at 29; see also id. at 23; Brief 
of the United States as Amicus Curiae (Gov. Br.) at 
9-10. There is no basis for this position under Title VII, 
as we now show. 
I. Title VIl's Language 
Section 703 (a) (1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (a) 
(1), forbids "discriminat[ing] against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin." As this Court 
recently held, 
The phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment" evinces a congressional intent " 'to strike 
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women" in employment.' Los Angeles Depart-
ment of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 
707, n.13 (1978). [Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 
- U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986) .] 
Just as "a hostile or offensive environment for members 
of one sex is [an illegal] arbitrary barrier to sexual 
equality'" and therefore an illegal "condition of employ-
ment" (Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 
2406, quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th 
Cir. 1982)), so the requirement that an employee submit 
to a decisionmaking process that treats men and women 
disparately on the basis of their gender and subjects 
women but not men to an added risk of an adverse out-
come is, in and of itself, an unlawful condition of em-
ployment.4 
4 That the statute proscribes "discriminating . . . with respect to" 
employment reinforces. the conclusion that Congress intended to 
reach not simply the end-result of decisionmaking processes but 
those processes themselves. Creating a promotion system that is 
less favorable to women assuredly discriminates against women 
"with respect to" promotion, even if it is not possible to trace any 
particular promotion decision to the sex-based aspect of the pro-





Even more clearly, the other pertinent substantive sec-
tion of Title VII, § 703(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2) 
(a) ( 2), reaches employment decisionmaking that relies 
upon a sex-based factor as a negative consideration. That 
section makes it unlawful for employers to 
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status 
as an employee, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, race, or national origin. 
Quite evidently, § 703 (a) (2) in terms proscribes 
decision-making processes that disadvantage women by 
placing a negative weight on femaleness. Such a process, 
as we have already seen, "tends to deprive [women] of 
employment opportunities ... because of sex" by creating 
a higher risk for women than for men that employment 
opportunities will be denied. As this Court stated so em-
phatically in one of its earliest Title VII cases: 
The objective of Congress in the enactment of [ this 
section of] Title VII is plain from the language of 
the statute. . . . It was to achieve equality of em-
ployment opportunities and remove barriers that have 
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of 
[male] employees .... What is required by Congress 
is the removal of artificial barriers to employment 
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate 
on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifi-
cations. [Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
430-31 (1971).] 
It is because Congress was concerned not simply with the 
end-result of employment decisions but also with purging 
the employment decisionmaking process of sex-based and 
( race-based) considerations that " [ t] he statute speaks 
not in terms of jobs and promotions, but in terms of 
limitations and classifications that would deprive any in-
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dividual of employment opportunities." Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (emphasis in original) .5 
In addition, § 703 (a) (2) proscribes practices that do not adversely affect any particular employment opportu-nity, but that do "adversely affect [a women's] ... status as an employee." To apply an evaluation process that gives weight to sex stereotypes adversely affects a wom-an's status in the workplace simply by giving credence to those negative stereotypes, much as mantaining race-segreated bathrooms in a workplace would do. In this instance, as in many others, the evaluation process re-sulted not only in a decision-to place the plaintiff on "hold" with respect to partnership-but also in written and oral statements regarding the plaintiff's strengths and weaknesses as an employee. Sex-stereotyping state-ments "adversely affect [a women's] status as an em-ployee" even when the decision is favorable-and assuredly do so when the decision is unfavorable-by conveying to fellow employees and to managers a gender-tainted view of the individual's worth as an employee. 
The foregoing reading of § § 703 (a) ( 1) & ( 2) is not altered in any way by the fact that Title VII provides that, to act unlawfully an employer must act "because of such individual's ... sex." That phrase does not re-quire that a sex-based (or race-based) consideration "cause" an adverse employment decision in the same sense 
5 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, and Connecticut v. Teal, su-pra, were both disparate impact cases. But it is plain that Con-gress in enacting Title VII was equally interested in rooting out barriers to equal opportunity that are not directly sex-based but have a disparate impact upon members of one gender and decision-making processes that place women at a disadvantage on directly gender-based grounds. Put another way, if the tests at issue in Griggs and Teal had deducted five points from the grade of every woman, there would have been no dispute, we suspect, as to whether those tests were invalid as tending to deprive women of employment opportunities; only because there was no such explicit link to a proscribed classification was there a cognizable argument on the employer's side. 
• 
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that a physical act "causes" a physical injury. As a lit-
eral matter, and as a matter of human psychology, an 
employer who takes action that is in part premised upon 
a sex-based consideration and in part premised also upon 
a legitimate consideration, has acted "because of ... sex" 
(although because of other reasons as well). The employ-
er's action is "on the basis of" and "takes into account" 
sex as a factor that has been accorded some weight in 
reaching the decision to act. Given the limits on our 
knowledge of the wellsprings of human action it is diffi-
cult-if not impossible-to give more content to the con-
cept of a discriminatory motive. 
In sum, the statutory words demonstrate that "it would 
be unlawful for defendant to put [an employee] at a dis-
advantage in the competition for promotion because of 
[sex], as well as to actually deny ... the promotion for 
this reason." Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th 
Cir. 1985) .6 Under this approach, because the unlawful 
employment practice is the flawed decisionmaking process 
itself and not simply its particular results, any causal 
requirement runs between the unlawful motivation and 
the process, and not between the unlawful motivation and 
the ultimate decision. 7 And that link is in mixed motive 
6 See id. at 1323 for a list of federal court of appeals cases adopt-
ing basically this same analysis. of the substantive reach of Title 
VII. See also, for a commentary that many of those cases found 
persuasive on this question as well as on the others in this case, 
Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title Vll 
Action, 82 Columbia L. Rev. 292 (1982). 
7 So, for example, "if an employer requires black employees to 
meet a higher standard [than whites to get promoted], the statute 
is violated even if [the blacks] actually meet [the higher standard] 
and get the jobs in question." Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d at 1321-22; 
see also, e.g., King v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 259 
(8th Cir. 1984) (an interview process that asks women questions not 
asked of men violates Title VII even if the defendant has legitimate 
reasons for not hiring the plaintiff). 
It is worth noting as well that in cases like this one, causation in 
the sense we use that term in regard to physical acts is ordinarily 
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cases almost always self-evident, since the discriminatory 
evaluation process is by definition one made discrimina-
tory by the very fact that tihe employer took orr is taking 
sex-based considerations into a,ccount and is giving those 
considerations a negative weight in its decisionmaking. 
It is therefore simply untrue that the foregoing reading 
of Title VII "make [s] illegal the existence of discrim-
inatory thoughts and expressions," "prohibit[s] discrim-
ination 'in the air' ", or "impose [s] liability for discrim-
inatory animus without more". Pet. Br. at 21; Gov. 
Br. at 9.8 
II. Title VIl's Policies 
Title VII's basic purpose is not simply to compensate 
individuals for economic losses due to proscribed dis-
crimination, but "to eliminate ... discrimination in em-
ployment based on [the proscribed factors]." H. R. Rep. 
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 ( 1963). For this rea-
son, the concept of illegal discrimination incorporated in 
the Act seeks to end any use of the proscribed considera-
tion factors in making employment decisions. As one of 
tihe floor managers of the bill explained: 
To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a 
difference in treatment or favor, and those distinc-
tions in treatment or favor which are prohibited by 
not in dispute. For example, on the facts in this case as found by 
the district court, the employer's conduct certainly caused Hopkins 
to be subjected to a discriminatory promotion evaluation system, 
and to be rejected for partnership pursuant to that system. The 
question is not whether the defendant caused Hopkins injury, but 
why, viz., with a motive forbidden by the statute, or with a legal 
motive. 
s For the reasons stated in the text, it is also plain that the legisla-
tive history quoted in support of the proposition that Title VII does 
require a causal connection between an unlawful motive and a 
proscribed employment practice (Pet. Br. at 24-26; Gov. Br. at 
8-10) does not advance the inquiry. For we too recognize the need 
for a causal link; the dispute is over the nature of that link, and 




section [703] are those which are based on any . 
of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, 
and national origin. . . . The bill simply eliminates 
consideration of color [and other proscribed criteria] 
from the decision to hire or promote. [110 Cong. 
Rec. 7213, 7218 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark). 
See also, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 13088 (1964) (remarks 
of Senator Humphrey).] 
Consistent with this legislative history, this Court has 
repeatedly stressed that: 
the primary objective [of Title VII] was a prophy-
lactic one ... [to] 'provide the spur or catalyst which 
causes employers and unions to self-examine and to 
self-evaluate their employment practices and to en-
deavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last ves-
tiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this 
country's history. [Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 U.S. 405,417 (1975).] 
See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, 401 U.S. at 
429-30; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers 
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 93 ( 1981) ; EEOC v. Associated Dry 
Goods Corp, 449 U.S. 590, 595 ( 1981) ; Tearnsters v. 
United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 324, 357-364. 
The reading of Title VII we suggest forwards the 
fundamental "prophylactic" purpose of the statute: em-
ployment decisionmaking free of the proscribed discrim-
inatory considerations. In contrast, on Price Water-
house's view of the statute, employers are free to violate 
that norm with impunity in a large number of instances, 
becoming liable even for injunctive and declaratory re-
lief only where the plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating 
that a proscribed discriminatory consideration was deter-
minative ( although not necessarily solely determinative) 
in a particular employment decision. Such an approach, 
far from encouraging employers to "self-examine and 
self-evaluate their employment practices" ( Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, 422 U.S. at 417), encourages 
continuation of the more subtle forms of employment 
discrimination. 
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Indeed, the result of such tainted decisionmaking proc-
esses is twofold: First, women and minorities are dis-
couraged in pursuing career opportunities, simply by 
reason of being treated disparately from, and more 
harshly than, their fellow workers. And second, there are 
certain to be numerous instances in which the proscribed 
discriminatory consideration embedded in the decision-
making process was in fact determinative, but in which 
the difficulty of reconstructing the employer's decision-
making process with sufficient precision to prove that 
impact proves insurmountable. It is undoubtedly for these 
very reasons that Congress in enacting Title VII created 
a cause of action for gender-biased decisionmaking on 
employment matters.9 
III. Analogous Cases In This Court 
The reading of Title VII suggested above is further 
buttressed by this Court's approach in cases arismg 
under the Constitution, and under the National Labor 
Relations Act. 
This Court has recognized first of all that the claim 
that a decisionmaking process does not meet applicable 
constitutional standards is sufficient to state a cause of 
action, and that questions relating to the connection be-
tween that flawed process and the decision actually made 
are matters that go to remedy, not liability. 
9 In this case, the district court found that sex stereotyping was 
not simply "a" facto,r in Price Waterhouse's decisionmaking process 
but a "significant" factor in that process. Pet. App. 25a. It is thus 
not necessary in order to affirm the decision below for this Court 
to decide whether any reliance on gender-based decisionmaking 
creates liability under Title VII, or whether there is room for a 
de minimis rule. 
We hasten to add that it is common ground that it is not sufficient 
to demonstrate simply that one or more of the individuals in a de-
cisionmaking capacity harbors discriminatory views; some factual 
basis for inferring that those views were given operative weight 
with regard to an employment decision is necessary. 
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For example, in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), while " [ t] he District Court held that ... [plaintiffs] had been suspended without procedural due process," there was no finding as to whether the plaintiffs would have been suspended if procedural due process had been ac-corded. Id. at 251-53. The Court, proceeding on the premise that liability had been established, approved a lower court ruling that " 'if [ the defendants] can prove on remand that [the plaintiffs] would have been sus-pended even if a proper hearing had been held,'" then no damages for injuries caused by the suspension would be available. Id. at 260.;10 The Court added, however, that "persons in [plaintiff's] position might well recover dam-ages for mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process" ( id. at 262), and held that because "tihe fact remains that [plaintiffs] were deprived of their right to procedural due process," nom-inal damages are available even if no actual damages could be proven ( id. at 266-67) .11 See also Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, -- U.S. --, 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986) (Carey principles apply to em-ployment decisions impermissibly taking into account First Amendment activity). Cf. LeBoeuf v. Ramsey, 503 F. Supp. 747 (D. Mass. 1980). 
Similarly, in Mt. Healthy School Dis-trict v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), the Court, after recognizing that a school teacher was discharged in part because of his "communication [to a radio station] protected by the 
10 The lower courts had granted injunctive and declaratory re-lief ( id. at 252) ; it is permissible to grant such relief, of course, only after liability has been established. 
1,1 The Carey Court identified the interests served by the con-stitutional due process requirement to be somewhat similar to those discussed above with regard to a Title VII violation for gender-tainted decisionmaking: "to, convey to the individual a feeling that the government [in this instance, the employer] has dealt with him fairly, as well as to minimize the risk of mistaken deprivations of protected interests." Id. at 262. 
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First and Fourteenth Amendments," ( id. at 284), indi-
cated that it was sufficient to establish a constitutional 
violation for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the commu-
nication "was a 'substantial factor'-or, to put it in other 
words, that it was a 'motivating factor' in the Board's 
decision," ( id. at 286-287) .:12 The Court then turned to 
the separate remedial question of whether "Doyle is 
entitled to reinstatement with backpay ;" viz., to the 
question of whether there was a "constitutional violation 
justifying remedial action." Id. at 284, 285; emphasis 
added. And the Court concluded that the normal rein-
statement with backpay remedy would not follow from · 
the constitutional liability if-and only if-the defendant 
demonstrated that the unconstitutional decisionmaking 
process was not responsible for plaintiff's loss of his job; 
viz., that the plaintiff would have been discharged in any 
1,2 The Mt. Healthy Court did not spell out the underlying rea-
sons for describing the elements of the constitutional cause of ac-
tion in this way. However, a few years before, in Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972), this Court had explained the re-
lationship between the First Amendment and public employee dis-
charges for free speech : 
[E]ven though a person has no 'right' to a valuable govern-
ment benefit for any number of reasons, there are some rea-
sons upon which the government may not rely .... For if the 
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his 
constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise 
of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. 
The essence of the constitutional violation alleged in Mt. Healthy 
was that the School Board has acted upon one of those "reasons 
upon which the government may not rely." Once this was proven, 
under Perry the plaintiff had established a constitutional wrong. 
See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (decided the same 
day as Mt. Healthy) (because "racial discrimination is not just 
another competing consideration", "proof that a discriminatory 
purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision" is sufficient 
"proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose" to show "a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.") 
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event. Id. at 287.1~ See also Givhan v. Western Line 
Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 694, 416 ( 1979) 
(referring to the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting rule as 
dealing only with the question when "a public employee 
must be reinstated") ; Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 ( 1978) ( Opin-
ion of Powell, J.). 
This Court has in addition approved a similar ap-
proach under the National Labor Relations Act. NLRB 
v. Transportation Management Co., 462 U.S. 393 ( 1983), 
reviewed an NLRB construction of § 8 (a) ( 3) of the 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3), the section proscribing 
"discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment ... to encourage or discourage membership in any 
labor organization." Under § 8 (a) ( 3) as construed by 
the NLRB and approved by this Court, "to establish an 
unfair labor practice the General Counsel need show by 
a preponderance of the evidence only that a discharge is 
in any way motivated by a desire to frustrate union 
activity." 462 U.S. at 398-99. An unfair labor practice 
is established if the employer in its decisionmaking proc-
ess gives negative weight to the consideration that an 
individual is a union adherent. The Board tihen permits 
the employer to establish as an "affirmative defense"-
viz., as a basis for avoiding liability based upon a con-
sideration other than failure to prove the cause of 
action ( C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil § 1270 at 289-92 and § 1271 at 313-16) 
-that the employer would have taken the same action 
absent the illegal motivation, and thereby to avoid a 
coercive order. 
While permitting this "affirmative defense"-burden 
shifting approach, the Court made clear that the· burden 
,rn Of course, as Memphis Community School District v. Stachura 
supra, was later to confirm, even if there were no reinstatement 
or back pay available, nominal and, where appropriate, actual com-
pensatory damages for the constitutional violation would still lie, 
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shifts to the employer only after all the elements of an 
unfair labor practice-viz., after the factors necessary to 
establish that " [ t] he employer is a wrongdoer"-have 
been made out. 462 U.S. at 401-02. And the Court ap-
proved this approach as a permissible variant upon an 
alternative the Board was also free to adopt; viz., the 
alternative of providing some relief, but not reinstate-
ment and backpay, where the unfair labor practice was 
proven but the employer could demonstrate that the 
charging party was not economically injured thereby. Id. 
at 402.14 
IV. The Common Law of Causation 
Contrary to the argument pressed by the United States 
(Gov. Br. at 10-16), the construction of Title VII we 
advocate is in no way at odds with modern concepts of 
14 The Board, of course, has wide discretion in determining what 
remedies, if any, to provide once an unfair labor practice has been 
adjudicated. See NLRB v. Food Store Employees Local 347 (Beck's, 
Inc.), 417 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). In approving the "affirmative defense" 
approach as an alternative to providing at least some remedy for 
an adjudicated unfair labor practice, the Court in Transportation 
Management did not deal with the matter de nova but rather recog-
nized the wide berth the NLRB is accorded in the area of remedy-
ing unfair labor practices. 
It was our view, when Transportation Management was decided 
(see Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Transportation Man-
agement, at 12-21) and remains our view, that to refuse to provide 
at least prospective relief once it has been determined that an em-
ployer "is a wrongdoer" under the NLRA does not forward that 
statute's purposes. 
Under Title VII, unlike the NLRA, the Court is not reviewing 
an administrative agency's construction of a statute but is con-
struing an enactment in the first instance. In this circumstance 
there are no deference considerations that preclude adoption of a 
construction which most completely forwards the statute's purposes. 
For the reasons discussed previously in the text, with regard to 
Title VII that construction is one that views liability as established, 
and appropriate relief available, on a showing that a proscribed 
consideration was taken into account in the decisionmaking process. 
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causation in tort law.1'5 Rather, it is now quite widely accepted: ( a) that approaches to causation which depend upon answering hypothetical factual questions are to be avoided in favor of analyses that view what actually happened and ask only whether the defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor" in bringing about the injury; (b) that causation-in-fact issues cannot be determined in a policy vacuum, but must be considered with an eye toward the purposes of the substantive norm at issue, and particularly toward whether that norm was intended to avoid the risk of inflicting injury as well as to avoid the infliction of actual injury; and ( c) that for various policy-related reasons it may be appropriate to transfer the burden of proving traditional but-for causation from the plaintiff to the defendant. 
(a) While the United States derives its "sufficient cause" concept from a few fairly recent tort law com-mentaries, that concept is in fact both narrower and differently focussed than the concept most commonly ac-cepted today.1'6 Thus, the most widely read text on torts recognizes (albeit grudgingly) that 
•115 The discussion of causation concepts in the brief for the United States is excellent and accurate as far as it goes. We therefore take that discussion as a departure point and show in the text that the "sufficient cause"' concept the government suggests is much narrower than the causation concepts current in tort law today. 
One point bears noting in this regard: It is far from clear that tort Jaw causation concepts are an appropriate analogy in the pres-ent context. And, in fact, in developing the law in the other sub-stantive areas that turn upon the motive with which an employer or government took detrimental action, this Court has not gen-erally reasoned on the basis of common law tort causation con-cepts. In the end, we believe reasoning of the kind presented here-tofore in this brief, based upon the particular statutory scheme and taking into account the particular role of human motivation in decisionmaking, is more pertinent than common law ideas of causation. 
:ie The suggestion at one point in the United States' brief that the "sufficient" cause concept is the one applied by this Court in 
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a broader rule [than the "but for" rule] ... has 
found general acceptance. The defendant's conduct is 
a cause of the event if it was a material and substan-
tial element in bringing it about. . . . It has been 
considered that "substantial factor" is a phrase suf-
ficiently intelligible to furnish an adequate guide ... 
and that it is neither possible nor desirable to reduce 
it to any lower terms. [W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. 
Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law 
of Torts 267 ( 5th Ed. 1984) ] .1•1 
Mt. Healthy and Transportation Management (Gov. Br. at 21) is 
mistaken. 
In the first place, in those cases the Court concerned itself with 
describing the constitutional or statutory violation in terms of 
what actually motivated the employer; that, presumably, is why 
the term "motivating factor" was used in both cases, to describe 
a factor that was in fact one of the actor's motives. The govern-
ment's analysis, in contrast, requires determination of hypothetical 
issues concerning whether a legitimate motive would have been 
"sufficient" to cause the injury in question had the illicit motive 
not played a role in the decision. 
Moreover, nothing in Mt. Healthy or Transportation Manage-
ment (or any other of this Court's relevant cases) purport to set 
a threshold that excludes from the liability determination factors 
that, in this case, were "significant" in the decisionmaking process, 
but may have been neither necessary nor sufficient to the decision 
standing alone. Rather, as we have demonstrated, a constitutional 
violation on the one hand, or an unfair labor practice on the other, 
can be made out simply by showing that an impermissible motive 
played a significant role in the decisionmaking process; necessity 
or sufficiency becomes relevant at the remedy stage, if at all. 
;17 See, for the seminal articles from which this now-dominant ap-
proach was derived, Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 Stan. 
L. Rev. 60 (1956); Green, The Casual Relation Issue, 60 Mich. L. 
Rev. 543 (1962). 
Malone, for example, argues. at some length that there is no 
judicial support for the proposition that the "substantial factor" 
test should be limited to situations in which "the force set in mo-
tion by the defendant would have been sufficient to produce the 
damage alone". Malone, 9 Stan. L. Rev. at 90-91: 
It is difficult to appreciate how the limitation in question 
serves any purpose of administration or policy. . . . [For ex-
1 
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This approach avoids-and in large measure is deemed 
superior to the alternatives on the ground of avoiding-
the hypothetical, counter-to-fact nature of the "but for" 
and "sufficient" cause approaches, in which the trier of 
fact "is invited to make an estimate concerning facts 
that concededly never existed." Malone, supra, 9 Stan. 
L. Rev. at 67; see also W. Kee~on et al., s-upra, at 265. 
( b) The "substantial factor" formulation was devel-
oped, in large part, in recognition of the proposition that 
"in the law 'cause in fact' ( as it was once called), like 
proximate cause, is in the end a functional concept de-
signed to achieve human goals." Calabresi, Co!Merning 
Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kal-
ven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 107 ( 1975). In partic-
ular, the "substantial factor" formulation permits fact-
finders to adjust the tightness of the required relation-
ship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's 
injury to reflect the strength and the nature of the policy 
expressed in the relevant legal rule. See Malone, supra, 
9 Stan. L. Rev. at 91 & passim. As such, the "substan-
ital factor" approach reflects a broader recognition that 
cause concepts cannot be articulated in a policy vacuum: 
The question in a particular case as to whether 
the relationship between the defendant's conduct and 
the plaintiff's harm is close enough to warrant appli-
cation of the pertinent rule of law requires the court 
to determine whether the rule was designed to pro-
tect against the type of injury suffered by the plain-
tiff. This answer is influenced by the court's reading 
ample], [i]f the fire started by plaintiff was sizeable and 
merges with another fire, why must the court require the jury 
to make an estimate at plaintiff's risk as to whether defend-
ant's fire would have worked the same destruction unaided? 
If the flames he caused to be put in motion were actively play-
ing a part, is it not enough to inquire whether that part was 
sufficient to warrant an imposition of liability? This can be 
adequately expressed through the use of the term "substantial" . 
. . . No further safeguard is needed. [Id.] 
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of how "exacting" or strict the rule of law is. More-
over, where the defendant's act is intentional rather 
than negligent, the courts are apt to be satisfied with 
a relationship more tenuous than one they would 
otherwise require. The willingness of courts in the 
tort area to view 'cause-in-fact' from a goal oriented 
perspective and to shape it to respond to changing 
social needs is reflected in myriad decisions, ranging 
from the well-known Summers v. Tice 33 Cal. 2d 
80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) to recent developments in the 
products liability field fashioning novel theories of 
enterprise and market share liability to provide re-
coveries not contemplated by traditional causation 
doctrine. [Brodin, supra, 82 Col L. Rev. at 313-14.] 
Of particular relevance here is the stress in the recent 
tort case law on identifying the risk to which the de-
fendant's actions improperly exposed the plaintiff, and 
adjusting the causation concept ( as we argue above 
should be done under Title VII) to that risk.
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(c) As one of the ways of adjusting causation con-
cepts to the legal rule's underlying policy, courts in tort 
cases have altered the ordinary burden of proof as to 
causation. For example, Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80 
(1948) involved a situation in which there were two 
negligent gunmen, each of whom shot at the plaintiff. 
Because of the difficulty in establishing which gun fired 
the wounding bullet, the court placed on each defendant 
the responsibility of proving that he was not the respon-
,i.s Perhaps the most noteworthy examples of this approach are 
the "chance of life" cases, in which the defendant's actions reduced 
the chance that a plaintiff would survive when those chances were 
already less than fifty percent. Rather than asking, as a "but for" 
approach would, whether absent the defendant's negligence, the 
plaintiff would more likely than not have survived, several courts 
have viewed the increased risk of harm due to defendant's conduct 
as sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant's negligence was a 
"substantial factor" in causing the plaintiff's death. E.g., Herskovits 
v. Group Health Insurance, 664 P. 2d 474 (Wash. 1983); Hicks v. 
United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966). 
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sible gunman. This is just one of several examples in which recent tort decisions shifted the burden of proof on causation to the defendant because of the unfairness, for various reasons, of placing that burden on the plain-tiff. See also, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756 (1970); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 cert. denied 469 U.S. 826 (1984).19 
•19 Thus, even if it were not true, as we argue above, that the Mt. Healthy/ Transportation Management approach is best viewed as shifting the burden of persuasion on causation only after liabil-ity is established, there is no insurmountable common law barrier to shifting the burden to the defendant at the liability stage for many of the same policy r easons that justify, in our view, regarding the cause of action to be established without demonstrating an effect upon a particular employment decision. See Transportation Manag ement, supra, 462 U.S. at 403 ("The employer is a wrong-doer; he acted out of a motive that is declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing."). 
It is worth noting as well that there is yet one mo,re approach to the mixed motive causation problem that yields basically the same result argued for in the text. That approach views the problem as presenting a harmless error issue, in the same sense that complaints about the bias of an administrative or judicial factfinder, or reliance on impermissible evidence, raises such an issue. Cf. Johnson v. Reed, 609 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1980). 
Where harmless error issues are raised, whether in criminal or civil law, the placing of the burden of proof and the standard of proof applied depends primarily on the nature of the procedural violation; the stronger the norm violated, the more likely it is that the burden of proving harmless error will be placed upon the party seeking to preserve the tainted result. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967); United States v. Argentine, 814 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1987) ; Haddad v . Lockheed California Corp., 720 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1983) and cases cited; Price Bros. Co. v. Philadel-phia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1980); cf. McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342 (1936). 
In this instance, as we have seen, the very premise of Title VII is that sex-based or race-based decisionmaking is fundamentally unfair to the individuals affected and socially destructive. Under 
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The upshot of the foregoing foray into tort law is not 
that this Court, in this case or any other, should attempt 
to model the Title VII law of causation on the latest tort 
law analysis. Rather, the point is that contemporary tort 
law does not take the rigid approach to cause issues sug-
gested by either Price Waterhouse or by the United 
States, but instead develops doctrine in response to the 
very sorts of considerations we argued earlier are per-
tinent under Title VII. And modern tort doctrine sup-
ports the conclusion implicit in Title VII itself: The 
essentials of a cause of action under Title VII can be 
established in a mixed motive situation by showing that 
sex or some other proscribed consideration played a nega-
tive role in the decisionmaking process concerning a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment. Whether or not 
that adverse effect was enough to make a difference as to 
a particular employment decision is a question going to 
remedy and not to liability. 
V. The Title VII Burden of Proof Issues Presented Here 
As we have seen, this Court in Mt. Healthy created, 
and in Transportation Management approved, rules 
which allow a defendant who has committed a wrong to 
demonstrate that the wrong does not warrant certain 
relief. At the same time, those two cases explicitly ap-
prove placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant 
who endeavors to take advantage of the opportunity to 
avoid remedial relief. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; 
Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 403. In effect, 
the Court shifted to the defendant the very real risk that 
those circumstances, it appears that shifting the burden of persua-
sion to the defendant to prove, convincingly, that the defect in the 
decisionmaking process was harmless would be justified, and that 
in the absence of such proof the decision actually made could not 
stand. In other words, the result should be the same as it would be 
if a party were attempting to void the results of a decision made 
by a judge proven to have taken race into account in reaching his 




it will be difficult to persuade a trier of fact as to what 
would have happened if what actually happened had not 
happened. 
The Court has concluded, in other word. that the 
wrongdoer seeking to escape providing the plaintiff relief 
must at least "bear the risk of the uncertainty which 
his own wrong has created." Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pic-
tures, 327 U.S. 251, 265 ( 1946) ; see also Story Parch-
ment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 
555, 565 ( 1931) ; NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 
F .2d 862 ( 2d Cir.) ( L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 
576 ( 1938). This uncertainty, it bears noting, is con-
siderably greater where, as in these cases, human moti-
vation rather than physical causation is in question; 
while physical occurrences tend to follow rules of cause 
and effect that are at least theoretically ascertainable, 
the same cannot be said of the complexities of human 
thought and behavior. 
There is, in all these regards, no basis for distinguish-
ing the situation under the Constitution and the NLRA 
from that under Title VII. 20 The court of appeals deci-
sion in this case, however, could be said to go beyond the 
language of Mt. Healthy and of Transportation Manage-
rnent in one respect: the court below held that a clear 
and convincing standard of evidence applies. 
We submit that, however the requirement is phrased, 
in this species of cases, the burden of persuasion imposed 
should be sufficient to assure as a practical matter that 
20 The suggestion by the United States (Gov. Br. at 23) that such 
a defense is mandated by ,§ 706(g) of Title VII is surely in error. 
The part of § 706(g) forbidding affirmative relief and back pay if 
the employment decision was "for any reason other than discrimi-
nation" is modelled on§ l0(c) of the NLRA. Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 n.11 (1975). And the parallel language 
in § lO(c) was construed in Transportation Management as "not 
meant to apply to cases in which both legitimate and illegitimate 
causes contributed to the discharge .... " 462 U.S. at 401 n.6. 
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the risk of uncertainty is born by the wrongdoer. Tha~ 
for example, is the NLRB's practice. 
Thus, the Board requires that the evidence presented 
by the employer to prove that the same decision would 
have been made through untainted decision-making must 
be more than simply testimonial attestations as to what 
would have been done absent a discriminatory motive. 
See McLane / Western, Inc. v. NLRB, 827 F.2d 1423, 
1425 (10th Cir. 1987); NLRB v. Searle Auto Glass, Inc., 
762 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Horizon 
Air Services, Inc., 761 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1985); 
NLRB v. Townsend and Bottum, Inc·., 722 F.2d 297, 302 
(6th Cir. 1983). Similarly, where it is an established 
policy that is relied upon to prove what would have hap-
pened in the absence of a discriminatory motive, the 
Board has generally required clear evidence that the 
policy existed, that the policy applied to the situation at 
hand, and, as well, that the policy was strictly and uni-
formly enforced. McLane / Western, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, 
827 F.2d at 1425 & n.5; Airborne Freight Corp. v. 
NLRB, 728 F.2d 357, 358 (6th Cir. 1984); A&T Manu-
facturing Co., 276 NLRB 1183 (1985); PY A / Monarch, 
Inc., 275 NLRB 1194 (1985). 
The "clear and convincing evidence" rubric used by the 
court of appeals seems as well adapted as any other to 
convey the standard that these cases actually apply, and 
quite properly so. That standard focusses directly on the 
two relevant factors in reducing the risk of uncertainty 
created by the employer's unlawful acts: the type of evi-
dence presented ( "clear" rather than ambiguous) and the 
degree of certainty that evidence conveys ( "convincing" 
rather than equivocal). Where, as here, the appropriate 
alternative would be not a lower standard of proof but 
eliminating the counter-to-fact proof altogether, the de-
fendant is in no position to complain. See also Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 421 (backpay should be 
denied under Title VII "only for reasons which, if applied 
29 
generally, would not frustrate the central statutory pur-
pose of eradicating discrimination throughout the econ-
omy and making persons whole for injuries suffered 
through past discrimination."). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court 
of appeals should be affirmed. 
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